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MANDATORY LIFE SENTENCE WITHOUT PAROLE FOUND
CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE FOR COCAINE POS-
SESSION-Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
Andrew H. Mun
Abstrac" In Harmelin v. Michigan, the United States Supreme Court held (5-4) that a
legislatively-mandated life sentence without parole for possession of 672.5 grams of
cocaine did not violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amend-
ment. In reaching the result, two Justices abrogated the proportionality principle in the
Eighth Amendment and three Justices abridged the proportionality standard promulgated
in Solem v. Helm. This Note examines the Harmelin decision and suggests that the Court
does not adequately justify abrogating or limiting the Solem proportionality standard.
This Note recommends application of the Solem proportionality standard and concludes
that imposition of a mandatory life sentence without parole for drug possession is
unconstitutional.
When Ronald Harmelin failed to make a complete stop at a red
light, two police officers stopped and searched him. 1 They found mari-
juana cigarettes, assorted pills and small vials of cocaine in his posses-
sion.2 The officers searched Harmelin's trunk and discovered two bags
containing 672.5 grams of cocaine.' In 1989, Michigan convicted
Harmelin, a first time offender, under a controlled substance statute
that mandated life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.'
Five Justices' of the Supreme Court upheld the life sentence.6 Justice
Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, found Harmelin's sentence
constitutional because the Eighth Amendment embraced no propor-
tionality guarantee.' Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O'Connor
and Souter, found no gross disproportionality between the legislatively
mandated life sentence and the crime.'
This Note examines Harmelin and concludes that the Court erred in
disregarding the existing Eighth Amendment proportionality doctrine.
1. People v. Harmelin, 440 N.W.2d 75, 77 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989), cert. granted, Harmelin v.
Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
2. Id. at 77.
3. Id. at 78. The two bags contained roughly 1.5 pounds of cocaine. This amount of cocaine
has a potential yield of 32,500 to 65,000 doses. See ARNOLD M. WASHTON, COCAINE
ADDICTION: TREATMENT, RECOVERY, AND RELAPSE PREVENrION 18 (1989).
4. Harmelin, 440 N.W.2d at 76-77. The Michigan statute provides that a person who
"knowingly or intentionally possess[es] a controlled substance... [w]hich is in an amount of 650
grams or more of any mixture containing that controlled substance is guilty of a felony and shall
be imprisoned for life." MICH. COMP. LAWS §333.7403(1), (2)(a)(i).
5. Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, Kennedy, O'Connor and Souter.
6. Harmelin v. Michigan, Ill S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
7. Id. at 2686.
8. Id. at 2705-08.
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Part I summarizes the origin of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause and the development of the proportional-
ity principle. Part II criticizes Justice Scalia's abrogation of the pro-
portionality principle and Justice Kennedy's abridgement of
proportionality standard promulgated in Solem v. Helm. 9 Part III dis-
cusses the negative implications of Harmelin. Finally, Part IV argues
for the use of the Solem proportionality standard and applies it to find
that Harmelin's sentence violates the Eighth Amendment.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE EIGHTH AMIENDMENT'S
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSE
The belief that the punishment should fit the crime is deeply rooted
in Western civilization. The proportionality concept appears in funda-
mental social documents, such as the Bible and the Magna Carta.° In
the Old Testament, God introduced to Moses the lex talionis or law of
retribution, giving rise to the concept "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a
tooth."11 The Magna Carta devoted three chapters to the rule that
"amercement" may not be excessive. 2 Chapteir 20, for instance,
declared that a "freeman shall not be amerced for a small fault, but
after the manner of the fault; and for a great crime according to the
heinousness of it." 13
The English Bill of Rights formally codified the proportionality con-
cept that had become part of English common law.14 The Framers of
the Eighth Amendment in turn adopted the words of the English
predecessor." Later, however, questions arose as to the precise pur-
pose and meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.
Although commentators agreed that the Eighth Amendment afforded
at least those protections embodied in its English counterpart, there
was considerable disagreement about exactly what protections the
9. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-91 (1983).
10. See Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted-" The Original
Meaning, 57 CAL. L. Rnv. 839, 844 (1969).
11. Exodus 21:23-25; Leviticus 24:19-20 (The New International Study Bible).
12. An amercement was similar to a modern-day fine. It was the most common sanction in
thirteenth century England. See 2 FREDERICK POLLACK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 513-15 (2d ed. 1909); MAGNA CARTA, chs. 20-22 (1215).
13. See 1 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 4 (1978) (translation of the Magna Carta).
14. See Granucci, supra note 10, at 846. The English Bill of Rights reads: "excessive Baile
ought not to be required nor excessive Fines imposed nor cruell and unusuall Punishments
inflicted." Id. at 853.
15. The Eighth Amendment was based directly on Art. I, sec. 9, of the Virginia Declaration
of Rights (1776), authored by George Mason. Mason, in turn, had adopted the language of the
English Bill of Rights. See Granucci, supra note 10, at 840-41.
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English Bill of Rights guaranteed. 16 Some commentators believed that
the Framers intended the words "cruel and unusual" to prohibit only
barbaric punishments 7 such as pillorying, 8 decapitation, and drawing
and quartering.19 In light of the evidence that the English never pro-
hibited barbaric punishment, other commentators argued that the
clause actually prohibited excessive punishments.2" American courts,
relying on the former interpretation, virtually ignored the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause for nearly one hundred years because the
so-called "barbaric" practices had long become obsolete.2 '
A. The Development of the Proportionality Approach
Not until the nineteenth century did the Supreme Court, in Weems
v. United States, 22 recognize that disproportionately excessive punish-
ments violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.23 After
Weems, the Supreme Court grappled with defining the precise bounda-
ries of the Eighth Amendment protection. While the Court firmly
applied the proportionality concept in the context of capital punish-
ment cases,2 4 considerable controversy surrounded the application of
16. See id. The Eighth Amendment was taken directly from the English Bill of Rights of
1689 which prohibited only excessive punishments. Id However, the American Framers
misinterpreted the English Bill's purpose and subsequently designed the Eighth Amendment to
prohibit barbaric punishments. Id; see also William H. Mulligan, Cruel and Unusual
Punishments The Proportionality Rule. 47 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 639 (1979) (arguing that the
Eighth Amendment was intended only to prohibit torture); Deborah A. Schwartz & Jay
Wishingrad, The Eighth Amendmen4 Beccaria, and the Enlightenment: An Historical
Justification for the Weems v. United States Excessive Punishment Doctrine, 24 BuFF. L. REv.
783 (1975) (arguing that the Framers were greatly influenced by the Italian writer Cesare
Beccaria, a firm believer in having punishment proportionate to the seriousness to the offense).
17. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 389-400 (1910) (discussing early attitudes
toward the Eighth Amendment). The Weems Court noted that although the scope of the clause
had never been clearly defined, the Eighth Amendment could be interpreted to proscribe, at a
minimum, tortuous and barbaric punishments. Id. at 368; see also Nancy Keir, Solem v. Helm.:
Extending Judicial Review Under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to Require
"Proportionality" of Prison Sentences, 33 CATH. U. L. REv. 479, 481 (1984).
18. A pillory is a device with holes for the head and hands in which petty offenders were
formerly locked and exposed to public scorn. WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1360 (2d
ed. 1983).
19. Drawing and quartering is dismembering the body into four parts. Id at 1476.
20. See Granucci, supra note 10, at 844; Schwartz & Wishingrad, supra note 16, at 835-38.
21. See Keir, supra note 17, at 481.
22. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
23. Id The principle of proportionality had been advanced previously by Justice Field,
dissenting in O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892). Field concluded that the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause "is directed... against all punishments which by their excessive
length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged." Id. at 339-40.
24. See, ag., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) (death sentence
grossly disproportionate to crime of rape and thus violative of Eighth Amendment); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976) (plurality opinion) (death sentence does not violate Eighth
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the Eighth Amendment to mere sentences of imprisonment.2" The
Supreme Court, in Rummel v. Estelle,26 refused to apply the propor-
tionality principle to a life sentence that contemplated the possibility
of parole.27 Only three years later, however, the Court in Solem v.
Helm,"2 on slightly different facts, determined that a discretionary life
sentence without parole violated the proportionality principle and
thereby triggered the proscriptions of the Eighth Amendment.29
1. Articulating a Proportionality Principle
In Weems v. United States,30 the Supreme Court first recognized
that the Eighth Amendment had a broader scope -than perhaps origi-
nally intended by the Framers.3" Relying on evolving standards of
justice, the Court found cadena temporal 3 2 comparatively dispropor-
tionate to the crime of falsifying an official document.33 The Court
concluded that the Eighth Amendment required graduated and pro-
portioned punishment. a4 Just as the Framers considered torture cruel
and unusual punishment, the Weems Court believed that cadena tem-
poral was cruel and unusual by modem standards.35
Some lower courts recognized in Weems a constitutional require-
ment that all offenses and punishments be proportionate.36 Other
courts interpreted Weems narrowly, and maintained that absent the
Amendment when statutory scheme ensures that sentencing is not disproportionate to offense),
stay granted, 429 U.S. 1301 (1976), order vacated, 429 U.S. 875 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam, with each Justice filing a separate opinion in addition) (death
penalty unconstitutional under Eighth Amendment).
25. See Charles W. Schwartz, Eighth Amendment Proportionality Analysis and the Compelling
Case of William Rummel, 71 3. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 378, 412-20 (1980) (concluding that
proportionality review should not be extended to prison sentences). But cf Malcolm E.
Wheeler, Towards a Theory of Limited Punishment: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment,
24 STAN. L. REV. 838, 853-55 (1972) (proportionality of prison sentences should be required
under Eighth Amendment).
26. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
27. Id. at 266, 272.
28. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
29. Id. at 288-89.
30. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
31. Id. at 380-81.
32. Cadena temporal punishment included imprisonment, hard and painful labor, and chains
at the ankles and wrists. Id. at 364.
33. Id. The Court engaged in a comparative analysis to determine whether cadena temporal
was disproportionate. It compared cadena temporal with punishments for similar offenses in the
United States as well as penalties inflicted for more severe crimes in the Philippines. Id. at
380-81.
34. Id. at 367.
35. Id at 364-65, 377.
36. See, eg., Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974)
(excessive sentence may be invalid solely because of disproportionality).
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unusual penalties of cadena temporal, the Court would not have held
Weems' punishment disproportionate.37 Despite the discord, Weems
provided a foundation for the proportionality principle that the Court
would eventually carve into Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
2. Applying the Proportionality Principle to Capital Punishment
The Supreme Court extended Eighth Amendment proportionality
review to death penalty cases in Coker v. Georgia.3" Stressing that the
death penalty "[was] unique in its severity and irrevocability,"39 the
Court found that rape constituted a far less serious crime than crimes
deserving the death penalty.' The Court inquired into the nature of
the crime and the punishment, the punishments imposed in other
jurisdictions for rape, and the penalties available in the same jurisdic-
tion for other offenses.4 The Court concluded the death penalty
excessive for the crime of rape.42
The Coker Court did not address whether the proportionality stan-
dard applied to non-capital sentences. 43 As a result, lower courts
developed widely different interpretations regarding the meaning and
scope of the proportionality principle. Some courts restricted propor-
tionality analysis to punishments considered cruel in their methods or
inherent irrevocability, such as capital punishment.' Other courts
liberally applied proportionality analysis to prison sentences, and held
punishments cruel and unusual solely on the basis of excessive
length.45
3. Restricting Proportionality Review to Capital Punishment
The Supreme Court's decision in Rummel v. Estelle' adopted the
narrower interpretation of the Eighth Amendment.47 In Rummel, the
Supreme Court rejected the argument that a life sentence with the pos-
37. See, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 294 (1980) (restricting proportionality analysis
to unique punishments like the death penalty).
38. 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion).
39. Id. at 598 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
40. Ia. at 597-98.
41. Id. at 593-600.
42. Id. at 598.
43. Keir, supra note 17, at 488.
44. See, e.g., Anthony v. United States, 331 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1964); Smith v. United States,
273 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 846 (1960); Goodloe v. Parratt, 453 F.
Supp. 1380 (D. Neb. 1978), rev'd on other grounds 605 F.2d 1041 (8th Cir. 1979).
45. See, eg., Downey v. Perini, 518 F.2d 1288 (6th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 423 U.S.
993 (1975); Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974).
46. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
47. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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sibility of parole imposed on a third-time offender -violated the propor-
tionality principle.48 The Rummel Court qualitatively distinguished
the defendant's life sentence from the death penalty, and found the
Coker rationale minimally helpful.49 The Court was reluctant to
review non-capital punishments, and concluded that prison sentences
could not violate the proportionality principle solely on the basis of
length.50
4. Expanding the Proportionality Guarantee to Non-Capital Cases
Just three years after Rummel, the Supreme Court revisited the
issue of whether a life sentence fell within the scope of the Eighth
Amendment. Distinguishing Solem's punishment factually from
Rummel's,51 the Court, in Solem v. Helm, 52 determined that a life sen-
tence without parole, discretionarily-imposed by the trial judge, vio-
lated the Eighth Amendment.53 The Solem Court explicitly rejected
the notion that only death penalty cases required proportionality.54
The Court held that cases involving prison sentences could not logi-
cally be immune from the general mandate of proportionality. 55 The
Court reasoned that the important factor was not the sentence itself,
but rather the disparity between the sentence imposed and the crime
committed.
56
In an effort to shelter Eighth Amendment review from subjective
values, the Solem Court proposed the use of a three factor proportion-
ality standard to determine whether a punishment violated the Eighth
Amendment. 57 First, the Court assessed the gravity of the crime in
48. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 285.
49. Id at 272.
50. Id at 273 -74.
51. Solem involved a discretionarily-imposed life sentence without parole. Solem v. Helm,
463 U.S. 277, 281-84 (1983). "[O]ur decision today is not inconsistent with Rummel v. Estelle
.... Rummel did reject a proportionality challenge to a particular sentence. But since the
Rummel Court... offered no standards for determining when an Eighth Amendment violation
has occurred, it is controlling only in a similar factual situation." Id at 303 n.32. By constrast,
Rummel involved a mandatory life sentence with the possibility of parole. Rummel, 443 U.S. at
267.
52. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
53. Id. at 284. Jerry Helm was convicted of six non-violent and alcohol-related felonies. Id.
at 279. He pleaded guilty to a seventh felony of passing a no account check for $100.00. Id. at
281.
54. Id. at 288-89.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 289.
57. Id. at 290-91. The three factor standard was a reiteration of the factors used in Weems
and Coker.
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relation to the severity of the punishment."8 Second, the Court com-
pared the punishment with penalties imposed for other crimes in the
same jurisdiction.59 Third, the Court compared the punishment with
penalties imposed in other jurisdictions for the same crime.' The
Solem Court applied the three factors and found the discretionarily-
imposed life sentence without parole for a seventh felony grossly
disproportionate.6"
Solem represented an important decision in Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence for two reasons. First, the Solem Court expressly
announced a three part proportionality standard, similar to the test
promulgated in Weems and Coker.62 Second, Solem set broader
boundaries for proportionality review by extending it to discretionary
life sentences without parole. The opinion, however, left open the
question whether the proportionality principle applied to mandatory
life sentences without parole.
B. Restricting Proportionality: An Unclear Message
In Harmelin v. Michigan,63 the Supreme Court accepted the chal-
lenge of defining the proper scope of the Eighth Amendment in the
context of a mandatory life sentence without parole. The Harmelin
Court held that a legislatively-mandated life sentence without parole
for cocaine possession did not violate the Eighth Amendment.' No
majority opinion prevailed, except on the issue that a mandatory life
sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment solely because it pre-
58. Id. The Court determined the gravity of the crime by examining the harm caused or
threatened to the victim or society and by measuring the culpability of the offender. Iae at 296.
The Court concluded that Helm's crime was one of the most passive felonies a person could
commit. IL The amount of money involved was small and no violence occurred. By contrast, a
life sentence without the possibility of parole, the most severe punishment authorized in South
Dakota, was imposed. lId at 297, 281 n.6 (death penalty prohibited in South Dakota).
59. Id. at 291. The Court made a detailed analysis of punishments in South Dakota to
compare Helm's sentence to sentences set for other crimes. Id. at 298-300. The Court found
that South Dakota mandated a life sentence for murder, treason, first-degree manslaughter, first-
degree arson and kidnapping. Id. at 298-99. The Court concluded that Helm had been treated
"in the same manner as, or more severely than, criminals who [had] committed far more serious
crimes." Id. at 299.
60. Id. at 291. The Court found that Helm could have received a life sentence in only one
other state, Nevada. Id. at 299. Even in Nevada, however, there was no evidence that courts
actually imposed the sentence for such a minor offense. Id. The Court concluded that South
Dakota treated Helm more severely than any other state. Id. at 300.
61. Id. at 290-93.
62. See supra notes 33, 41 and accompanying text.
63. 111 S. Ct 2680 (1991).
64. Id. at 2693, 2701-02; id. at 2705-08 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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cluded consideration of mitigating factors.6 1 Rather, the Court
divided into three groups.
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, upheld the life sen-
tence, concluding that the Eighth Amendment embraced no propor-
tionality guarantee.66 Justice Scalia contended thait life sentences did
not qualify as barbaric punishments, and therefore Harmelin's sen-
tence could not be considered unconstitutional.67 Justice Scalia,
unenthusiastic about encroaching into the legislature's domain,68
argued for restricting proportionality analysis to capital punishment
cases and for overruling Solem.69 Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices
O'Connor and Souter, concurring in the result, determined that the
Eighth Amendment prohibited only extreme or grossly disproportion-
ate sentences.70 Justice Kennedy revised the Solem standard71 by
deferring to legislative assessments regarding sentencing schemes.72
Justice Kennedy found the first Solem factor sufficient to determine
proportionality, 7 and concluded that Harmelin's sentence was not
grossly disproportionate in light of the grave threat caused by drugs.74
Justices Blackmun, Marshall, Stevens, and White, dissenting, found
no justification for overruling or limiting the Solem precedent 75 and
65. The Court refused to extend the "individualized capital-sentencing doctrine," which takes
into account a defendant's criminal history and character to mandatory life sentences. Id. at
2701-02 (part V of Justice Scalia's opinion, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist joined, and with
which Justices Kennedy, O'Connor and Souter concurred).
66. Id. at 2686, 2692. For support, Justice Scalia cited a controversial interpretation of the
Framers' original intent. According to Justice Scalia, the Framers intended the Eighth
Amendment to protect only against barbaric punishments, like torture, pillorying and
decapitation. Id. 2691-96.
67. Id. at 2686, 2692.
68. Justice Scalia found judicial intrusion into the power of state legislatures to enact and
enforce criminal laws unacceptable. Id. at 2684-86. This Note argues that Justice Scalia's
deference to legislatures substantially eliminates judicial review of mandatory sentencing
schemes. See infra notes 135-43 and accompanying text.
69. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2696-99.
70. Id. at 2705 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
71. Id. at 2707 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 2703-04 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
73. Justice Kennedy concluded that intra- and inter- jurisdictional analyses are appropriate
only in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence
imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality. Id. at 2707 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
74. Id. at 2709 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 2716 (White, J., dissenting). Justices Blackmun and Stevens joined Justice White's
dissenting opinion. Justice Marshall filed a separate dissent to emphasize his continued belief
that capital punishment is per se unconstitutional. Id. at 2719 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens, joined by Justice Blackmun, filed a separate dissent, observing that a life sentence for
drug possession is too severe because the punishment rejects all possibility of rehabilitation. Id.
at 2720 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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applied the three part standard to conclude that Harmelin's sentence
was unconstitutionally disproportionate.76
II. THE HARMELIN RESULT RESTS ON FLAWED
ANALYSIS
Harmelin provides no legitimate reason for abrogating or aban-
doning the prevailing proportionality standard. By relying on the
Framers' original intent, Justice Scalia denies the existence of any pro-
portionality principle77 and thereby ignores Supreme Court decisions
that unequivocally advance a proportionality standard. Under close
scrutiny, Justice Scalia's historical analysis does not justify abrogating
the proportionality principle.78 Justice Kennedy, on the other hand,
adheres to the proportionality principle, but inappropriately redefines
the three factor standard.79 By collapsing the three part Solem stan-
dard into one threshold test, Justice Kennedy undermines his goal of
determining disproportionality objectively. 0 This Note contends that
Justices Scalia and Kennedy do not adequately justify overruling or
limiting Solem's full application.81
A. Justice Scalia Ignores Historical Controversy and Stare Decisis
1. Deferring to the Framers' Original Intent
Justice Scalia bases his conclusion that the Framers only intended to
prohibit barbaric punishment on disputed historical analysis.82 Rely-
ing on the English Bill of Rights as conclusive evidence of the Eighth
Amendment's purpose, Justice Scalia concludes that the Framers only
intended to prohibit barbaric punishment.8" Justice Scalia's conclu-
sion, however, is questionable. Commentators disagree over exactly
what the English Bill of Rights prohibited.84 As one author suggests,
76. Id. at 2716-19 (White, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 2686, 2692.
78. See infra notes 82-98 and accompanying text.
79. See infra notes 107-24 and accompanying text.
80. See infra notes 107-24 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 82-124 and accompanying text.
82. Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct 2680, 2686-91 (1991). Justice Scalia concludes that the
circumstances of the English Bill of Right's enactment and the contemporaneous understanding
of the English guarantee refute the notion that the Eighth Amendment protected against
disproportionate punishment. Id. at 2687-91. The English guarantee was directed at the
arbitrary use of the sentencing power by the King's Bench in particular cases and at the illegality,
rather than the disproportionality, of punishments imposed. Id. at 2693-95. But see supra note
20 and accompanying text.
83. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2686-91.
84. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
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the English guarantee was never directed against barbaric punish-
ments.8 5 To the contrary, the English used barbaric punishments they
believed were proportionate to offenses.8 6 The Framers provided simi-
lar proportionality guarantees by transcribing into the Eighth Amend-
ment the language of its English counterpart.8 7 Contrary to Justice
Scalia's conclusion, the Eighth Amendment does not protect solely
against barbaric punishment.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has explicitly held that the Eighth
Amendment contains a proportionality principle, and bars more than
just barbaric punishments. 8  Beginning with Weems, the Supreme
Court has recognized that courts must engage in a comparative analy-
sis to determine whether a particular punishment violates the Eighth
Amendment.9 The Supreme Court progressively extended the
boundaries of Eighth Amendment review first to unusual punish-
ments, 9' then to the death penalty,91 and finally to discretionarily-
imposed life sentences without parole. 92 Consequently, Justice Scalia's
narrow reading of the Eighth Amendment not only is based on contro-
verted interpretation of the Framers' original intent but it also ignores
Supreme Court precedent.
Even if Justice Scalia's historical analysis of the Eighth Amendment
were correct, his conclusion that the amendment contains no propor-
tionality principle93 fails to consider the evolving meaning of the
phrase "cruel and unusual." Justice Scalia inappropriately measures
cruel and unusual punishment using the outdated standard of 1789.14
Even Justice Scalia, however, acknowledges that extreme examples,
like a mandatory life sentence for a parking ticket, violate the Eighth
Amendment.95 Nevertheless, Justice Scalia's strict confinement to
eighteenth century interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ment Clause fails to consider punishments other than torture or decap-
itation as violative of the Eighth Amendment. Consequently, Justice
85. See Granucci, supra note 10, at 847-48. By 1689, England had still not developed a
prohibition on cruel or barbaric methods of punishment. Id. Although a general policy against
excessiveness was expressed repeatedly, objection to particular methods of punishment was very
rare. Id.
86. See id. at 843-44.
87. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284-86 (1983).
88. See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 33, 41, 57-60 and accompanying text.
90. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
91. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
92. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
93. Harmelin v. Michigan, Ill S. Ct. 2680, 2686 (1991).
94. Id. at 2691-94.
95. Id. at 2696-97 n.ll.
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Scalia's interpretation of the Eighth Amendment would allow life
sentences for petty violations to remain unquestioned and
unreviewable.
Despite Justice Scalia's view, the Eighth Amendment compels a dif-
ferent result. Whether a punishment may be characterized as barbaric
should depend on evolving standards of justice.9 6 Forms of punish-
ment the Framers tolerated should not be imposed under modem
standards of fairness and decency.97 To accommodate the evolving
understanding of cruel and unusual, courts must evaluate the severity
of a particular punishment and ensure that, according to current stan-
dards, the punishment fits the crime.98
2. Extending Proportionality Review to Mandatory Life Sentences
Without Parole
A liberal interpretation of the Court's proportionality doctrine
would extend review to all forms of criminal sentencing.99 The nar-
rower interpretation, however, restricts proportionality analysis only
to cases involving the death penalty. In Harmelin, Justice Scalia
adopted the narrower view and insisted on differentiating the death
penalty and a life sentence without parole.10
Extending proportionality review to mandatory life sentence with-
out parole follows logically in light of the view that capital punishment
falls within the scope of Eighth Amendment review. Capital punish-
ment and mandatory life sentences without parole share one important
characteristic: the offender never regains freedom.101 Both punish-
ments assume that the offender exhibits an incapacity for reform and
rehabilitation. 10 2 Justice Scalia, however, differentiates the death pen-
alty from a mandatory life sentence without parole.103 Justice Scalia
offers reassurances that retroactive legislative reduction and executive
clemency provide means by which life sentences may be reduced or
96. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910) ("Time works changes, brings into
existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of wider
application than the mischief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions.")
97. See supra notes 30-35, 38-42, 51-61 and accompanying text (for example, cadena
temporal for falsifying a documents; death penalty for rape; discretionarily-imposed life sentence
for seventh nonviolent crime).
98. Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2713 (1991) (White, J., dissenting).
99. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
100. Harmeln, 111 S. Ct. at 2702.
101. Id. at 2719 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 2720 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 2702 (distinguishing death penalty from mandatory life sentence because death
penalty is "unique in its total irrevocability ... [and] rejection of rehabilitation").
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rescinded."° Elected officials rarely enact retroactive reductions in
drug sentences, however, for fear of revealing a weak stance against
drugs. 05 Executive clemency similarly offers little hope because gov-
ernors rarely exercise this power. 11 6 The irrevocability and rejection
of rehabilitation inherent in the death penalty and in mandatory life
sentences without parole support treating the two punishments simi-
larly. Thus, proportionality analysis naturally extends to cases involv-
ing life imprisonment without parole.
B. Justice Kennedy Abridges the Solem Standard
From Weems to Solem, the comparative analysis under the propor-
tionality principle has entailed a three part comparison.' 0 7 In Harme-
lin, however, Justice Kennedy revises the existing proportionality
standard. Justice Kennedy adheres to the proportionality principle,"0 8
but disregards the three part Solem standard."° Instead, Justice Ken-
nedy concludes that the first Solem factor- comparing the severity of
the punishment to the gravity of the crime" --constitutes a sufficient
means of evaluating the disproportionality of a particular sentence.I'1
The language of Solem and the earlier Court decisions contradict Jus-
tice Kennedy's interpretation." 2 The Solem decision recognizes that
no one factor will be dispositive in determining disproportionality. 113
104. Id.
105. Susan LaCava, Comment, Taking and Federal Impairment of Contract Issues in the
Extension of Preemption of Due-on-Sale Restrictions Beyond Federal Savings and Loan.% 58 IND.
L.J. 651, 661 (1983) ("retroactive legislation traditionally has been regarded as undesirable
because it reduces the possibility of planning conduct with reasonable certainty of the legal
consequences").
106. See Jeffrey Kassel, Comment, Sentence Modification by Wisconsin Trial Courts, 1985
Wis. L. R-v. 195, 233 (1985) (executive clemency is rarely granted to criminals serving
sentences); see also Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983) ("possibility of commutation is
nothing more than a hope for an ad hoc exercise of clemency").
107. See supra notes 30-68 and accompanying text; see also Solem, 463 U.S. at 290 n.17
("The inherent nature of our federal system and the need for individualized sentencing decisions
result in a wide range of constitutional sentences. Thus no single criterion can identify when a
sentence is so grossly disproportionate that it violates the Eighth Amendment . . . . [A]
combination of objective factors can make such analysis possible.").
108. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2702 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("stare decisis counsels our
adherence to the narrow proportionality principle that has existed in our Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence for 80 years").
109. Id. at 2706-07 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
110. Solem, 463 U.S. at 290-91.
111. Harmelin, 111. S. Ct. at 2707 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Only when the threshold
comparison results in gross disproportionality do the second and third factors enter into the
calculus.
112. Solem, 463 U.S. at 290 n.17.
113. Id.
724
Mandatory Life Sentence for Cocaine Possession
Thus, Justice Kennedy's emphasis on the first factor goes against
Solem's recommendation and the pattern of earlier decisions.
Justice Kennedy points to objectivity as one of four important prin-
ciples in proportionality review. 14 Justice Kennedy, however, under-
mines his important goal by using the least objective Solem factor to
measure disproportionality.115 The first Solem factor is central to the
proportionality concept,116 but applied alone, it is the factor least
capable of objective measurement. 117
Comparing a crime's gravity to the punishment imposed requires a
subjective judgment.11 Judges can lessen subjectivity about the rela-
tive gravity of various crimes and punishments by using accepted
precepts of criminal law. 119 These criteria, however, are hardly helpful
when balancing a particular crime against a particular punishment.
Subjective judgments enter when comparing two fundamentally differ-
ent elements: punishment and crime. The elements require different
scales of measurement and assessment. For example, judges gauge the
severity of the punishment by considering the societal goals of deter-
rence, rehabilitation, retribution and incapacitation. 120 On the other
hand, judges use the criminal's culpability, intent, and motive, and the
nature of the injury to measure the gravity of the crime.12 1
The complexity of sentencing decisions and the absence of agree-
ment on the goals of punishment, or the best methods of achieving
those goals, 122 make this comparison inevitably subjective. Without
further intra- and inter- jurisdictional comparisons, reasonable persons
114. See Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2704-05 (Kennedy, J., concurring). First, courts should
grant substantial deference to legislative determinations. Id at 2703-04. Second, the Eighth
Amendment does not mandate adoption of any legitimate sentencing scheme. Id. at 2704.
Third, marked divergences of sentencing schemes are the product of federalism. Id Fourth,
proportionality review should be informed by objective factors to the maximum possible extent.
Id at 2704-05.
115. See infra notes 116-24 and accompanying text.
116. The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV. L. REV. 70, 133 (1983).
117. Id
118. Id at 133-34.
119. For example, judges should punish crimes against persons more severely than ones
against property. Stealing one million dollars is more severely punished than stealing one
hundred dollars. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 290, 293 (1983). Negligent acts are less culpable than
reckless acts and therefore punished less severely, and reckless acts less than malicious acts. Id.
Moreover, in the hierarchy of punishments the death penalty is considered the harshest
punishment.
120. See WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AuSIN W. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW 23-25 (1986).
121. Solem, 463 U.S. at 292-94.
122. See LAFAVE & Scor, supra note 120, at 22-27.
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can easily disagree on the appropriateness of the punishment. 123 Even
Justice Scalia argues that the first Solem factor necessitates a subjec-
tive determination.124 Justice Kennedy's effective abandonment of the
second and third factors makes any attempt at consistent proportion-
ality analysis futile because the comparison made under the first
Solem factor constitutes a value judgment. Justice Kennedy conse-
quently fails to satisfy his own criterion of objectivity in determining
whether a punishment is proportionate to the crime.
III. THE RAMIFICATIONS OF HARMELIN
A. Harmelin Does Not Provide Adequate Guidance for Lower
Courts
Harmelin leaves lower courts with no clear statement regarding the
scope of the Eighth Amendment. Much confusion stems from the
incongruous rationales employed by Justices Scalia and Kennedy to
reach the same outcome. 25 Justice Scalia directly rejects prior Court
decisions,126 and bases his position on controverted interpretations of
the Framers' original intent. 27 Justice Kennedy, on the other hand,
defers to stare decisis,128 but abridges the three factor proportionality
standard promulgated in Solem. 129 Moreover, Justice Kennedy under-
mines his own goal of achieving objectivity in prcportionality review
by emphasizing the least objective factor.1 " Thus, Harmelin fails to
provide answers to the questions of whether the proportionality princi-
ple applies to legislatively-mandated life sentences, and if so, what
kind of proportionality review standard applies. Without guidance,
lower courts will find assessing the constitutional validity of punish-
ment schemes difficult, if not impossible.
Given the inconsistent opinions of the Harmelin Court, lower courts
should confine Harmelin to the three discrete points on which a
majority of Justices agrees. First, although subject to debate regarding
123. For example, Justice Kennedy, applying the first Solem factor, found a life sentence
without parole for 672.5 grams of cocaine possession a reasonable punishment. Harrnelin v.
Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2706-07 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice White, applying
the first factor, found the same sentence excessive. Id. at 2716-18 (White, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 2697-98.
125. See supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
128. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2702 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
129. Id. at 2707 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
130. See supra notes 114-24 and accompanying text.
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its precedential value,131 the majority view establishes that a
mandatory life sentence without parole for possession of 672.5 grams
of cocaine is not unconstitutional. 13 2 Second, a majority agrees that a
mandatory life sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment solely
because the sentence precludes consideration of mitigating factors.133
Third and most importantly, seven Justices hold firm to some kind of
proportionality principle."3 Harmelin provides support for these
three propositions.
B. Harmelin Inappropriately Curtails Judicial Review by Deferring
to Legislatures
Despite the narrowness of its holding, Harmelin essentially elimi-
nates judicial review of legislatively-mandated prison sentences. 35
Justice Scalia denounces judicial intrusion into criminal sentencing
because punishments are a matter of legislative prerogative.13 6 Justice
Kennedy similarly defers to legislatures by concluding that legislative
determinations are "fortified by presumptions of right and legality. 1 37
By forming a presumption of constitutionality, five Justices have abdi-
cated virtually all power to review legislatively-mandated prison
sentences.
Guarding legislatively-mandated sentences from constitutional scru-
tiny, however, violates a settled principle of American jurispru-
dence. 1 3  Although legislatures should have independence to carry
out local penal and public goals, determining whether legislatures have
131. This first proposition is subject to debate because of the plurality nature of the opinion
and the fact that the majority did not agree on the reason for the holding. See Linda Novak,
Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 756
(1980). The author demonstrates the difficulty of laying down clear interpretative rules that will
be applicable to the many different types of plurality decisions. How a particular decision should
be handled depends on a variety of factors, including the precise nature of the issues presented
and their relation to the broader area of law involved, the alignment of the Justices on a
particular issue, the interrelationship between the various rationales suggested, and the degree to
which a subsequent case is legally or factually distinguishable.
132. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2701; iL at 2705-08 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
133. These Justices included Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, Kennedy, O'Connor and Souter. Id.
at 2701-02; id at 2707-09 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
134. Justices Kennedy, O'Connor and Souter concluded that the Eighth Amendment
prohibited only extreme sentences. Id. at 2702-05 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justices White,
Marshall, Stevens and Blackmun concluded that the Eighth Amendment prohibited
disproportionate sentences. Id. at 2709-20 (White, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 2684; id. at 2703 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 2684, 2696-99.
137. Id. at 2704 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 379 (1910)).
138. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("ilt is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to [s]ay what the law is.").
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overstepped the constitutional boundary of permissible punishments
requires judicial review.'3 9 Justices Scalia's and Kennedy's legislative
deference argument, taken to its logical conclusion, would validate
imposition of a life sentence for a petty violation, because it limits a
court's ability to question the constitutionality of a legislatively-man-
dated sentence. Harmelin provides no mechanism for overcoming the
presumption of constitutionality, but instead offers empty reassurances
that these extreme cases will never occur."4 Legislatures, however, do
enact reactionary or extremist statutes.' 4 1 By over-emphasizing defer-
ence to the legislative branch of government, the liarmelin Court has
lost sight of the key issue: the judiciary remains the gate-keeper of
individual rights. 42  The Court must prevent states from
overzealously creating penal schemes that violate the Eighth
Amendment. 143
IV. PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW UNDER THE SOLEM
PRECEDENT SHOULD APPLY
The Harmelin Court should have applied the Solem standard. The
Solem standard faithfully reflects the proportionality principle estab-
lished in the Supreme Court's earlier decisions.'" Justices Scalia and
Kennedy provide no adequate justification for overruling or limiting
Solem's full application.' 41 On the contrary, Solem provides a worka-
ble standard for determining whether a punishment is disproportion-
ate because it requires a defendant to prove significant inter- and intra-
jurisdictional disparities. 146 Under the three part Solem standard,
Harmelin's mandatory life sentence without parole constitutes uncon-
stitutionally cruel and unusual punishment.
139. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The Court stated:
Judicial review, by definition, often involves a conflict between judicial and legislative
judgment as to what the Constitution means or requires. In this respect, Eighth
Amendment cases come to us in no different posture. It seems cnceded by all that the
Amendment imposes some obligations on the judiciary to judge the constitutionality of
punishment and that there are punishments that the Amendment would bar whether
legislatively approved or not.
Id. at 313-14.
140. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2696-97.
141. See, eg., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). The Supreme Court held
unconstitutional a statute making it a crime for a person to be addicted to the use of narcotics.
The statute required no proof of any criminal conduct.
142. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378-79 (1910).
143. See id.; Furman, 408 U.S. at 313-14 (White, J., concurring).
144. See supra notes 62, 107 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 82-124 and accompanying text.
146. Jonathan C. Aked, Note, Solem v. Helm: The Supreme Court Extends the Proportionality
Requirement to Sentences of Imprisonment, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 1401, 1430 (1984).
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A. Solem Provides a Workable Standard
The Solem standard has worked well in practice.1 47 Lower courts
seem to have little difficulty applying the tripartite standard.14 The
initial fear that Solem would open the floodgates of Eighth Amend-
ment litigation has not been realized. 49 Although the Solem standard
is not free from the imposition of subjective values,150 the application
of all three factors achieves a more objective ruling than applying just
the first factor, as proposed by Justice Kennedy. 51 Under Solem,
judges should overturn sentences when all three comparisons indicate
disproportionality.152 Giving weight to all three factors reduces the
likelihood that a punishment will be rejected without clear explanation
by the courts.
B. A Mandatory Life Sentence Without Parole for Drug Possession
Is Unconstitutional
1. Disparity Between Crime and Punishment
Ronald Harmelin was convicted for possession of 672.5 grams of
cocaine. Harmelin had no criminal record.' 53 His offense was not
exceptionally serious. Although the amount of cocaine suggests
intent to sell or deliver, 55 Harmelin was convicted only for possession.
For this nonviolent, first offense, Harmelin received life imprison-
ment without the possibility of parole. Harmelin's life imprisonment
constitutes an unconscionable punishment. For the crime of posses-
sion, Michigan mandated its harshest punishment. 5 6 States generally
reserve their harshest punishments for crimes involving great moral
turpitude, such as first-degree murder.'57 Crimes of moral turpitude
are immoral or wrong in themselves, or naturally evil.' 58 In contrast,
drug possession constitutes a crime of mala prohibutum1 59 -a crime
147. Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2712 (1991) (White, J., dissenting).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 2713 n.3 (White, J., dissenting).
150. See supra notes 107-24 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 107-24 and accompanying text.
152. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 n.17 (1983).
153. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2716 (White, J., dissenting).
154. Id.
155. 673.5 grams of cocaine is roughly equivalent to 1.5 pounds; see supra note 3.
156. Michigan prohibits the death penalty, therefore life imprisonment without possibility of
parole is the most severe punishment. See Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2716 (White, J., dissenting).
157. LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 120, at 32-35.
158. See id. at 32-33.
159. See, eg., State v. Hartzog, 26 Wash. App. 576, 593, 615 P.2d 480, 490 (1980), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part on unrelated grounds, 96 Wash. 2d 383, 635 P.2d 694 (1981).
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not inherently evil, but prohibited by legislative enactment. 160 Despite
the distinction, Michigan punished Harmelin with its harshest penalty.
2. Intra-Jurisdictional Comparison
Harmelin has been punished more severely than criminals commit-
ting more severe crimes in Michigan. Michigan mandates life impris-
onment without parole for two other crimes: first-degree murder,
161
and manufacture and distribution of drugs.162 These crimes can be
easily distinguished from Harmelin's offense. First-degree murder
involves an intentional or premeditated taking of life, often through
violence. The manufacture and distribution of drugs requires an
intent to contribute to the severe, subsidiary effects of drug abuse.
Drug possession, on the other hand, merely requires a knowing reten-
tion of a controlled substance.1 63 Unfairly, however, Harmelin was
punished as severely as a drug manufacturer and distributor or
murderer.
In addition, in Michigan, some violent crimes draw lesser sentences.
For example, mutilating or maiming a person' 6" and assault with
intent to do great bodily harm165 carry terms of 10 years or less. The
intra-jurisdictional comparison reveals that Michigan punished
Harmelin more or as severely than defendants committing more seri-
ous crimes.
3. Inter-Jurisdictional Comparison
Michigan is the only state in the country that mandates a sentence
of life imprisonment without parole for possession of 650 grams of
cocaine. 1 6 6 Only one other state, Alabama, has a similar mandatory
life sentence.167 Alabama, however, requires possession of ten kilo-
grams, or over fifteen times the amount that Harmelin possessed, to
justify a mandatory life sentence.' 6 For Harmelin's crime, Alabama
mandates a five-year minimum term.169 In comparison, some states
provide less than one year for an offense such as Harmelin's.171
160. Id.
161. MICH. COMP. LAWS §750.316 (1991).
162. MICH. CoMP. LAWS §333.7401(2)(a)(i) (1991).
163. See supra note 4.
164. MICH. CoMP. LAWS §750.397 (1991).
165. MICH CoMP. LAWS §750.84 (1991).
166. Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2718 (1991) (White, J., dissenting).
167. ALA. CODE § 13A-12-231(2)(d) (Michie Supp. 1991).
168. Id.
169. ALA. CODE § 13A-12-231(2)(b) (Michie Supp. 1991).
170. See, eg., Wyo. STAT. §35-7-1031(c) (1988) (not more than 6 months).
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The mandatory nature of Michigan's statute contributes to the dis-
parity. Some states provide a possible maximum sentence of life
imprisonment for Harmelin's offense.1 71 These states, however, allow
judges discretion in sentencing and grant an opportunity for parole.
In contrast, the Michigan statute denies judges any discretion in sen-
tencing and forecloses any consideration of a defendant's character. A
comparison with federal penalties further evidences the disproportion-
ality of Michigan's statute. 172 The inter-jurisdictional comparison
demonstrates that Michigan mandates the most severe punishment in
the country. In short, all three Solem factors indicate that Harmelin's
sentence violates the Eighth Amendment.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the Eighth Amendment does not expressly protect against
disproportional punishment, the Supreme Court has consistently read
into the Eighth Amendment a proportionality guarantee. The
Supreme Court progressively expanded the scope of the Eighth
Amendment first to unusual punishments, then to capital punishment,
and finally to discretionarily-imposed life sentences. In light of these
explicit holdings, Harmelin imprudently limits the scope of the Eighth
Amendment and finds a legislatively-mandated life sentence for
cocaine possession constitutionally permissible. Justice Scalia's con-
clusion that the Eighth Amendment does not contain a proportional-
ity principle finds no support in Supreme Court precedent and is based
on controverted historical analysis. In addition, Justice Kennedy's
threshold test for proportionality undermines both his own goal of
objectivity and the language of Solem, upon which he relies. Harmelin
provides lower courts with inadequate guidance and inappropriately
curtails judicial review of legislatively-mandated sentencing schemes.
Rather, the Harmelin Court should have applied Solem, which pro-
vides a consistent and workable standard of review. Under the three
part Solem standard, Harmelin's mandatory life sentence without the
possibility of parole violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against disproportionate punishment.
171. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §21a-278(a) (West Supp. 1991) (possession with
intent to sell or dispense).
172. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(1)(B)(ii) (1988) (possession with intent to manufacture or distribute
500 grams or more of cocaine punishable by a prison term not less than five or more than forty
years).
